Teaching Plato Under Restriction

Enguerran Preteseille 

In early January 2026, Martin Peterson was preparing course materials for the upcoming spring semester at Texas A&M when he received troubling news: the philosophy director required him to stop teaching passages of Plato’s Symposium. [1] The request contributed to a pattern of increased restrictions on race and gender ideology led by the Board of Regents. [2] The board approved university policies that prohibit any academic course which “advocates or teaches topics related to race and gender ideology, sexual orientation, or gender identity.” [3] This raised First Amendment concerns over academic freedom. [4] Is the Board of Regents allowed to restrict specific content within courses using university policy? Or are professors allotted greater autonomy where academic freedom is concerned? This paper argues that Texas A&M's restrictions likely violate the First Amendment since they impose viewpoint-based restrictions on classroom instruction and conflict with principles of academic freedom recognized by the courts.

Academic Freedom in the Courts: Fighting the Overly Broad

Sweezy v. New Hampshire marked one of the Supreme Court's earliest discussions of academic freedom, expressing concern over governmental intrusion into intellectual inquiry and university affairs. [5] In the opinion, Justice Frankfurter wrote “[a] sense of freedom is also necessary for creative work in the arts which, equally with scientific research, is the concern of the university.” [6] Although Sweezy did not establish a comprehensive doctrine for academic freedom, it laid an important foundation for the Court’s future academic freedom jurisprudence. [7]

In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the Court struck down loyalty-oath agreements imposed on university faculty. [8] The Court held that the policy was overly broad and could restrict scholarship at the university. [9] Justice Brennan echoed this concern, writing “Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom.” [10] Brennan further described academic freedom as a “special concern” of the First Amendment. [11] Keyishian became a landmark case after it strengthened constitutional protections for academic freedom and warned against a “pall of orthodoxy” in higher education. [12]

Regulating Employee Speech: Garcetti v. Ceballos

In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court held that public employees receive no First Amendment protection for speech made under their official duties. [13] The Court declined to outline the extent to which Garcetti applies to academia: “We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.” [14] This question would later be addressed by U.S. courts as they grasped the challenge of balancing previous academic freedom jurisprudence and novel uncertainty towards Garcetti.

The University’s Ability to Control Curriculum

Public universities are government institutions. [15] Educational program decisions have traditionally been made by universities and their governing boards rather than individual professors. [16] Should Texas A&M decide to remove their engineering program entirely, such a decision would generally fall within its authority. [17] If faculty possessed an independent constitutional right to determine course content, universities would struggle to establish a uniform program. Authority over its program includes control over specific topics within a subject and a course. [18] This argument holds weight because universities usually establish degree requirements, approve courses, and determine the educational objectives of academic programs. [19] However, Texas A&M’s policy goes beyond ordinary program decisions. Rather than establishing subject and program requirements, it restricts discussion of particular viewpoints concerning race, gender, and sexuality. [20] Such authority raises concerns of viewpoint discrimination. [21]

Viewpoint Discrimination and Academic Orthodoxy

The First Amendment prohibits viewpoint-based discrimination. [22] While the government may regulate certain instances of speech, restrictions that favor or disfavor particular viewpoints are unconstitutional and treated with the highest scrutiny. [23] In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia the Court held “viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” [24]  The Court shared similar concern in Keyishian in which Justice Brennan wrote about academic freedom: “that freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.” [25]

Texas A&M’s policy does not solely regulate educational programs and degree requirements. Instead, it restricts discussion of race, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity within the university classroom. [26] Faculty may teach such topics only when demonstrating a “necessary educational purpose.” [27] Unfortunately, the threshold and scope of “necessary educational purpose” is left undefined [28] and overly broad. The Court has required narrow specificity when regulating speech [29] since overly broad standards may “chill” protected expression. [30]  The lack of definition in determining a “necessary educational purpose” gives broad authority to administrators over regulating classroom discussion. Such discretion risks decisions based on ideological preferences rather than standardized content restrictions.

The restriction of Plato’s Symposium illustrates this issue. The text is a foundational work of ancient Greek philosophy and is widely taught in philosophy curricula. [31] The Symposium has themes of sexuality and gender; [32] thus, Texas A&M restricted its use on that basis. [33] If discussion of a foundational text in Western philosophy can easily be prohibited under this policy, then it becomes difficult to identify what principle constrains the policy’s application.

Post-​Garcetti Rulings on Academic Freedom

Garcetti’s ruling would support Texas A&M’s restrictive actions if the Supreme Court treats classroom speech as speech an employer may control. Garcetti does allow universities to regulate faculty speech in many cases [34], but not within an academic context. Both the Ninth Circuit in Demers v. Austin [35] and the Sixth Circuit in Meriwether v. Hartop [36] shared concerns over Garcetti’s involvement in academic matters. The courts concluded that Garcetti’s employee-speech framework does not apply to teaching and scholarship at public universities. [37] Meriwether went further by asserting speech protections in the classroom for professors, writing, “professors at public universities retain First Amendment protections at least when engaged in core academic functions, such as teaching and scholarship.” [38] Both Meriwether’s and Demers’ rulings assert Garcetti cannot be used to answer legal questions pertaining to academic freedom. [39]

Professor Peterson’s Case Examined

The Texas A&M policy that restricted Professor Peterson likely violates the First Amendment. The policy is overly broad and can justify viewpoint-based discrimination. For example, to receive approval for teaching topics of gender or race ideology, one must demonstrate a “necessary educational purpose,” a standard that is not defined. [40] Because the policy does not define what constitutes a “necessary educational purpose,” it is not narrowly tailored and may chill protected speech. [41]  The policy’s application to Plato demonstrates its ambiguity, where a foundational philosophical text can be restricted because it discusses sexuality or gender. Greater issues are raised under the consideration that there exists little guidance regarding what materials remain permissible.

The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech.” [42] Courts have exercised the highest scrutiny toward content-based restrictions on speech. [43] Texas A&M may have valid reasons for imposing those restrictions, but that does not justify a viewpoint-based restriction on academia. Students must examine and consider a variety of viewpoints, no matter the controversy. In Keyishian, the court shared the same sentiment: “The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’” [44] Defending academic freedom starts with resisting abridgements of classroom speech. If a professor can no longer use passages from Plato, then where does the policy draw the line? This issue extends further than one university restricting a professor. It is about preserving the free exchange of ideas; which is essential to the environment of higher education and the preservation of democracy.

[1] Emma Whitford, “Plato Censored as Texas A&M Carries Out Course Review.” Inside Higher Ed. Published January 7, 2026. https://www.insidehighered.com/news/faculty/academic-freedom/2026/01/07/plato-censored-texas-am-carries-out-course-review.

[2] Alan Blinder, “Texas A&M Ends Women’s Studies and Overhauls Hundreds of Classes on Race and Gender.” The New York Times. Published January 30, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/30/us/texas-am-gender-ethnic-womens-studies-academic-freedom.html.

[3] The Texas A&M University System, Civil Rights Protections and Compliance, System Policy 08.01, revised December 18, 2025, 2, https://policies.tamus.edu/08-01.pdf.

[4] FIRE, “Texas A&M to Philosophy Professor: Nix Plato or Be Reassigned,” January 7, 2026, https://www.thefire.org/news/texas-am-philosophy-professor-nix-plato-or-be-reassigned.

[5] Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).

[6] Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263.

[7] J. Peter Byrne, “Academic Freedom: A ‘Special Concern of the First Amendment,’” Yale Law Journal 99, no. 2 (1989): 289–293.

[8] Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).

[9] Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 590-591.

[10] Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.

[11] Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.

[12] Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.

[13] Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).

[14] Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.

[15] Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 180 (1972) noting that a public college is “an instrumentality of the State.” See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).

[16] James D. Gordon III “Individual and Institutional Academic Freedom.” Brigham Young University Studies 49, no. 2 (2010): 43–47.

[17] Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, “Planning Notification: Notice of Intent to Plan,” Texas Register 49, no. 32 (August 9, 2024), § 2.41, amended February 11, 2026, effective August 15, 2024.

[18] Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263; Gordon, “Individual and Institutional Academic Freedom,” 44.

[19] University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985)

[20] Texas A&M System, System Policy 08.01, 2.

[21] FIRE, “Nix Plato or Be Reassigned.”

[22] Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 829 (1995).

[23] Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 156 (2015)

[24] Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.

[25] Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.

[26] Texas A&M System, System Policy 08.01, 2.

[27] Texas A&M System, System Policy 08.01, 2.

[28] Texas A&M System, System Policy 08.01, 2.

[29] NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 433 (1963).

[30] Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 307 (1965); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 300 (1964).

[31] Marvin Easterling, “Symposium by Plato,” EBSCO Research Starters: Literature and Writing, EBSCO Information Services, Published 2022, https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/literature-and-writing/symposium-plato.

[32] J. H. Lesher, “A Course on the Afterlife of Plato’s ‘Symposium,’” The Classical Journal 100, no. 1 (2004): 75–85, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4133007.

[33] Texas A&M System, System Policy 08.01, 2.

[34] Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.

[35] Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2013).

[36] Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2021).

[37] Demers, 746 F.3d at 406; Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 504.

[38] Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 505.

[39] Demers, 746 F.3d at 406; Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 504.

[40] Texas A&M System, System Policy 08.01, 2.

[41] Also referred to as the “Chilling effect” in First Amendment court rulings.

[42] U.S. Const. amend. I.

[43] Reed, 576 U.S. at 156; Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 247 (2017).

[44] Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.