China's Use of Tianxia Philosophy and International Law For a Chinese-Centric World Order

Miya Martinez

On May 20, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a joint declaration pledging to build a “multipolar world and a new type of international relations.” [1] The topic of a future world order has been debated by international scholars when evaluating its development amid questions over the possible end of U.S. hegemony. Xi and Putin’s envisioned world is one in which economic, military, diplomatic power, and influence are placed into the hands of three or more countries. Nevertheless, these same ideas and principles of a multipolar world diverge greatly from President Xi’s vision of a ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’ [2] The concept of national ‘rejuvenation’ draws upon a historically rooted Chinese philosophy that recognizes China as the ‘middle country,’ [3] with China ordained as one kingdom under heaven (Tianxia). Xi has reinterpreted Chinese Tianxia, creating a contemporary understanding that fuses tradition with modern hegemony to craft a resurgent China. [4] While Beijing may outwardly advocate for multipolarity, an examination of China’s historic worldview alongside its engagement with international law suggests that China's ambitions appear to lie not in a multipolar world, but instead in a China-centric world order.

A multipolar world works within existing international legal frameworks, functioning through competition between several superpowers. This is unlike Tianxia, which originates outside of Western international norms and definitions. Despite Beijing's attempts to develop multipolarity through its own lens, the promotion of a single hegemonic interest has never functioned in a multipolar world order; this suggests that ancient Chinese Tianxia [5] and multipolarity may not be fully compatible. To understand how these two concepts may not align, it is imperative to look towards the origins of Tianxia and how it has been reformatted to fit a more contemporary Chinese worldview. Tianxia, as reinterpreted by President Xi to fit normative Western thought, articulates a “community of shared future for mankind,” [6] or an elaborate vision of a shared, common destiny for humanity (天下一家). Modern Tianxia has been referenced several times by Chinese leaders. First introduced by Hu Jintao and subsequently cited by Xi Jinping, it has become an established component of official political rhetoric after being added to the preamble of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. [7] The origins of Chinese Tianxia do not uphold Western notions of competition, multipolarity, and sovereignty. Instead, Tianxia alternatively envisions China as the benign hegemon, with the world seen as a unified sphere and China positioned at its center. [8] There remains a long-standing historical remembrance China has as being the regional superpower. This historical perception extends beyond Beijing, with China's role as a regional power having shaped historical perspectives throughout the Indo-Pacific. This may help explain why some Western perspectives have struggled to accurately predict or comprehend Chinese and Indo-Pacific international decision-making.

In 2017, Xi Jinping spoke at the United Nations Office in Geneva. While he did not explicitly mention Tianxia, President Xi appealed to its core principles by conceptualizing a China-led world order as a universal community. Calling for the construction of a “community of shared future for mankind,” and invoking the Swiss proverb “one for all, all for one,” [9] Xi promised a vision of shared and win-win development that closely follows the Tianxia ideal of a common destiny under heaven. China’s foreign policy emphasizes the “Chinese dream,” a unitary nationalistic dream about Chinese power rejuvenation. [10] Statements made by President Xi at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2022 [11] assert power rejuvenation goals while also framing the U.S.-led liberal world order as a major impediment to Beijing’s mandate. [12] While China may assert multipolarity today, nineteenth-century historical experiences with Western international law, demoting China to a “semi-colonial, semi-feudal society” via “unequal treaties,” [13] continue to influence Beijing's foreign policy decisions. If President Xi persists in appealing to Tianxia during public speeches, that may suggest China is more keen on a China-centered system rather than genuine multipolarity, wanting to re-emerge as the ‘middle country.’

Chinese foreign policy strategically uses international law to advance its interests. While Xi Jinping has advised all countries to “reject double standards” and the selective application of international norms, [14] official statements have also specifically argued against a “one-size-fits-all” approach to human rights. In 2022, the UN Human Rights Office released a report [15] after observing patterns of torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of China's Xinjiang Uyghur population, many of whom were detained in ‘re-education camps’ between 2017 and 2019. [16] The UN report concluded that China's actions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region may constitute serious human rights violations. [17] Xinjiang is not an isolated case of Beijing's selective commitments to international legal obligations. In 2020, the European Union and member states considered filing a case before the International Court of Justice, accusing the PRC of violating the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) via the Hong Kong national security legislation. [18] Likewise, in the 2016 Philippines v China arbitration, the tribunal rejected the legal basis of China's historic rights claims within the nine-dash line and found that several Chinese actions were inconsistent with the Philippines' rights under UNCLOS. [19] Despite the arbitral tribunal's 2016 ruling in favor of the Philippines, China rejected the decision, maintaining that it was “null and void.” [20] While China chooses to test the bounds of maritime and human rights law, when it comes to international trade, Beijing will consistently prefer preserving “the status quo.” These examples suggest that China, more likely than not, is willing to abide by international law while remaining active in seeking to shape legal norms to advance its interests. However, China will presumably continue pushing and testing the boundaries of the old Pax Americana world order, effectively mechanizing international law to work to its advantage.

Today’s world order positions the creators of international law and supranational organizations as the powerful players on the international stage. European powers successfully shaped international law to advance their own interests, employing it as a tool to justify colonization. [21] Likewise, following World War II, the United States gained international influence after establishing multilateral institutions based on international law that shaped global governance. [22] Whoever defines the rules through international law constructs global governance and becomes the true ‘middle country’ of any world order. It is understandable why China may view international law as a tool to advance its agenda. [23] China is playing a strategic game, picking and choosing to comply with laws serving Chinese foreign policy objectives, while deflecting from international rules that will not advance its interests. [24] Yet when viewing Chinese foreign policy with a Tianxia lens, it appears China is aiming to strategically push at international law, creating new bounds that would sustain Tianxia and a China-centered world order. Why look to multipolarity when Tianxia can be rebirthed?

The previously ‘sleeping giant’ [25] has awakened, finding abundant power after strategically testing international legal norms. China understood from the ‘century of humiliation’ [26] a function of international law as an instrument that the powerful use against the weak. [27] With a revival of Tianxia, China's maneuvering of international law appears less exclusively towards multipolarity and more as a means for the great power to bring itself to the regional center power, restoring a past glory.

[1] “‘Multipolar World’: What Xi and Putin Announced After Beijing Summit,” Al Jazeera, May 20th, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/20/multipolar-world-what-xi-and-putin-announced-after-beijing-summit.

[2] Maria Adele Carrai “Chinese Political Nostalgia and Xi Jinping’s Dream of Great Rejuvenation,” International Journal of Asian Studies, July 29th, 2020, 7-25, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479591420000406.

[3] Rush Doshi, “China and Global Governance,” Council on Foreign Relations, Accessed June 7th, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/.

[4] Kunwoo Kim, “Xi Jinping's Dream of Restoring the Tianxia,” Columbia Political Review, May 24th, 2025, http://www.cpreview.org/articles/2025/5/xi-jinpings-dream-of-restoring-the-tianxia.

[5] William A. Callahan, “The Chinese Notion of Tianxia,” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2, no. 1, February 1st, 2012, 1–9, https://doi.org/10.14318/hau2.1.015.

[6] May-Britt U. Stumbaum and Sharon De Cet, “China's ‘Natural Return’ to the Center: Beijing's Perspective on Strategic Competition, Drivers, and Alternative Models for World Order,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 23, no. 2, January 2024, 21-32, https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.23.2.06.

[7] Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Preamble, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html.

[8] Stumbaum and De Cet, “China's ‘Natural Return’ to the Center,”23.

[9] Xi Jinping, “Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind,” China Daily, January 18th, 2017,https://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201701/18/WS5c0627d5498eefb3fe46e12f/work-together-to-build-a-community-of-shared-future-for-mankind.html.

[10] Shirley Z. Yu, “Belt and Road Initiative: Defining China's Grand Strategy and the Future World Order,” Harvard University, March, 2018, 32, http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:37799759.

[11] Xi Jinping, “Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, October 16, 2022, https://www.idcpc.org.cn/english2023/tjzl/cpcjj/20thPartyCongrssReport/.

[12] Stumbaum and De Cet, “China's ‘Natural Return’ to the Center,” 25.

[13] Xi Jinping*,* “Speech at a Ceremony Marking the Centenary of the Communist Party of China,” Caixin Global, July 2nd, 2021, https://www.caixinglobal.com/2021-07-02/full-text-xi-jinpings-speech-marking-the-centenary-of-the-communist-party-of-china-101735173.html.

[14] Williams, “International Law with Chinese Characteristics,” 3.

[15] “OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations, August 31st, 2022, 1-45, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf.

[16] “Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” OHCHR, 17-18, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf.

[17] “Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” OHCHR, 43.

[18] European Parliament, “MEPs Call on EU to Consider Lawsuit Against China over Hong Kong” European Parliament News. June 19, 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20200615IPR81235/meps-call-on-eu-to-consider-lawsuit-against-china-over-hong-kong.

[19] The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People's Republic of China), July 12th 2016, UNCLOS, vol. XXXIII, 153–617, https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXXIII/153-617.pdf.

[20] Caitlin Campbell and Nargiza Salidjanova, “South China Sea Arbitration Ruling: What Happened and What's Next?” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, July 12th, 2016, 4, https://www.uscc.gov/research/south-china-sea-arbitration-ruling-what-happened-and-whats-next.

[21] Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, “Leveraging International Law: Is China Positioning Itself for Hegemony?” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, April 19th, 2022, https://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2022/4/19/leveraging-international-law-is-china-positioning-itself-for-hegemony.

[22] Darmawan, “Leveraging International Law,” 7.

[23] Robert D. Williams, “International Law with Chinese Characteristics: Beijing and the “Rules-Based” Global Order”, Brookings Institution, October, 2020, 1-11, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/FP_20201012_international_law_china_williams.pdf.

[24] Darmawan, “Leveraging International Law”, 8.

[25] Carter Chapwanya, “China’s Rise and the Napoleonic Prophecy,” Modern Diplomacy, March 7th, 2019, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/03/07/chinas-rise-and-the-napoleonic-prophecy.

[26] Alison Adcock Kaufman, “The ‘Century of Humiliation’ and China’s National Narratives”, testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 10th, 2011, 10, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf

[27] Simon Chesterman, “Can International Law Survive a Rising China?” European Journal of International Law, March 2nd, 2021, 1507-20, https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chaa089.